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It is generally assumed that in order to survive, people 
and animals need to extract contingency information from 
the environment. Doing this allows them to infer causal 
relations and to predict when important events will occur, 
which in turn allows them to prepare for these outcomes 
(see, e.g., Dickinson, 1980; Hollis, 1997). The large num-
ber of experiments on contingency learning that have been 
published during the last decades (see Shanks, 2007, for 
a recent review) are justified precisely on these premises. 
Contingency learning is critical for survival because it ul-
timately allows organisms to prepare for important events. 
A functional analysis of contingency learning, therefore, 
calls for the investigation of preparatory behavior. Thus, 
the scant attention that preparatory judgments have cap-
tured in the research community is highly surprising. Pre-
paratory judgments are not just one more additional type 
of judgment. They are the judgments that most naturally 
show the function that has traditionally been attributed to 
contingency learning. Indeed, if preparing for outcomes 
provides the function of contingency learning, then one 
would expect preparatory behavior to be closely depen-
dent on contingency information. Quite surprisingly, the 
(little) data available on preparatory judgments suggest 
otherwise.
The most commonly used metric of contingency is ΔP, 
which is the difference between the probability of the out-
come when the cue is present, p(O|C), and the probability 
of the outcome when the cue is absent, p(O|¬C) (Jenkins 
& Ward, 1965). The experimenter can manipulate the 
strength of the cue–outcome contingency by varying the 
frequencies with which the cue (e.g., a fictitious medi-
cine) and the outcome (e.g., a fictitious allergic reaction) 
occur or do not occur together. Interestingly, some reports 
have suggested that these contingency manipulations 
have a different effect on causal judgments than on pre-
dictive and preparatory judgments. For example, Vadillo, 
Miller, and Matute, (2005; see also Vadillo & Matute, 
2007) showed that contingency information had no im-
pact on participants’ likelihood of predicting the outcome 
in the presence of the cue. At the same time, however, 
participants in those studies showed an accurate use of 
contingency information to estimate both the causal and 
the predictive value of the cue. Thus, apparently, people 
use contingency to infer causal and predictive value, even 
though they do not use it to predict the likelihood that the 
outcome will follow.
In a related study, De Houwer, Vandorpe, and Beckers 
(2007) showed that contingency information was used to 
make accurate estimates of causal relations, whereas it 
had little impact on participants’ stating that they would 
prepare for the outcome when the cue was present. Con-
sistent with the findings of Vadillo et al. (2005) regarding 
outcome predictions, p(O|C) seemed to be the main deter-
minant of preparatory judgments as well.
At least at first glance, those results seem quite con-
trary to the idea that opened the present article—that 
contingency knowledge is needed both to predict the oc-
currence of important events and to prepare for them. 
From a normative point of view, it certainly does make 
sense to neglect the value of contingency when making 
predictions. After all, the value of p(O|C) is the only 
thing one needs to know when predicting whether the 
outcome will follow the cue. Information on p(O|¬C) 
becomes absolutely irrelevant in this case. But the poten-
tial dissociation between contingency and preparatory 
behavior is not that obvious. On the one hand, prepara-
tory judgments, like predictions, could simply rely on 
p(O|C). People could prepare for the outcome whenever 
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has not taken Dugetil and a picture of a bottle crossed in red were 
shown. To encourage their attention, participants had to answer the 
question Do you think that Mr. X is going to develop a skin rash? 
by clicking the “yes” or “no” button in every trial. Then, a feedback 
panel showed either the phrase Mr. X has developed the skin rash 
and a picture of an ill face (outcome-present trials), or the phrase 
Mr. X has not developed the skin rash and a picture of a healthy face 
(outcome-absent trials).
At test, every participant emitted three different judgments: 
a causal judgment (To what extent do you think that Dugetil is the 
cause of the skin rash that Mr. X suffers?), a prediction judgment 
(If Mr. X has taken Dugetil, to what extent do you think that he will 
develop a skin rash?), and a preparation judgment (If Mr. X has taken 
Dugetil, to what extent would you recommend him to take an oint-
ment in order to prevent a skin rash?). The three questions were dis-
played simultaneously, with their position (upper, middle, or lower 
panel of the screen) counterbalanced between participants. A rating 
scale ranging from 0 (labeled Definitely NOT ) to 100 (labeled Defi-
nitely YES) was displayed below each question.
Results
Figure 1 depicts the mean judgments at test. As was ex-
pected, a 3 (question) 3 2 (contingency) ANOVA showed 
significant main effects of question [F(2,98) 5 27.10, p , 
.001] and contingency [F(1,49) 5 17.07, p , .001], as well 
as an interaction [F(2,98) 5 6.14, p , .01]. Both causal 
and preparatory judgments were significantly higher in 
Group High than in Group Low [t(49) 5 6.46, p , .001, 
and t(49) 5 2.41, p , 0.05, respectively]. This indicates 
that both of these judgments were affected by contingency. 
Prediction judgments did not significantly differ as a func-
tion of contingency [t(49) 5 1.28, p 5 .21].
ExpERIMEnt 2
As was expected, in Experiment 1 we showed that both 
causal and preparatory judgments, but not predictions, 
were affected by contingency information. The results of 
the causal and prediction judgments were consistent with 
those of several previous human studies (e.g., Gredebäck 
et al., 2000; Matute et al., 2002; Vadillo et al., 2005; Va-
dillo & Matute, 2007). However, the results on prepara-
tory judgments, although expected, contradicted the null 
they know it will occur. On the other hand, however, 
it is not clear that the most adaptive behavior that one 
can adopt when preparing for an outcome should rely 
simply on p(O|C). If the outcome is occurring with the 
same probability regardless of whether the target cue is 
present or absent, this becomes a situation in which the 
outcome follows the cue regularly, but without any pre-
dictive relation between them. The cue is not a signal for 
the outcome, but a completely unrelated event. In this 
situation, organisms should look for another cue with 
greater predictive value to help them decide when to act, 
or else they will have to be preparing at all times for any 
of the many possible outcomes that could follow any of 
the millions of cues that are present at any given time. 
There are so many potential outcomes for which there 
are no known causes (or good signals) that it becomes 
impossible to prepare for them all. Thus, when prepar-
ing for outcomes, it might be much more efficient to 
rely on the predictive value of the cue, which depends on 
contingency, rather than on p(O|C). Indeed, if any con-
clusion can be drawn from decades of related research 
on Pavlovian conditioning, it is that nonhuman animals 
do use contingency to prepare for outcomes (Rescorla, 
1968). As for human preparatory Pavlovian responses, 
we know of no study that has tested whether they rely on 
cue–outcome contingency rather than on p(O|C).
In sum, further evidence is needed before we can reject 
(or accept) the general assumption that people use con-
tingency information to prepare for outcomes. Although 
several studies have shown a dissociation between causal 
judgments and predictions (e.g., Gredebäck, Winman, 
& Juslin, 2000; Matute, Vegas, & De Marez, 2002; Va-
dillo et al., 2005; Vadillo & Matute, 2007), the evidence 
of the dissociation between contingency and preparatory 
judgments relies on only one study (De Houwer et al., 
2007). Moreover, none of the aforementioned studies has 
explored the effects of contingency information on both 
outcome predictions and preparatory judgments. If our 
hypothesis is correct, then preparatory judgments, not 
predictions, might show sensitivity to contingency.
ExpERIMEnt 1
Method
participants. Fifty-one college students voluntarily took part in 
the study. A random assignment of participants into two groups re-
sulted in 24 participants in Group High, and 27 in Group Low.
procedure and Design. Participants were told to imagine that 
they were physicians who were trying to find out whether a relation-
ship existed between a cue (a fictitious medicine, Dugetil ) and an 
outcome (a side effect—skin rash—in a fictitious patient).
p(O|C) was 1 in both groups, but p(O|¬C) was .5 in Group High 
and 1 in Group Low. Therefore, Δp was .5 in Group High and 0 
in Group Low. This should permit us to compare the sensitivity of 
causal, prediction, and preparation judgments to specific manipula-
tions of covariational information. Judgments that are only sensitive 
to p(O|C) should not differ between these two groups, but judgments 
that are sensitive to Δp should.
Participants received 120 medical cards, 1 per trial. In cue- present 
trials, the computer screen showed the phrase Mr. X has taken Dug-
etil and a picture of a pill bottle. In cue-absent trials, the phrase Mr. X 
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Figure 1. Mean judgments in Experiment 1. Error bars repre-
sent 1 standard error of the mean.
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spaceships invade the screen faster than usual (one spaceship every 
50 msec). These invasions cannot be escaped once started. Thus, to 
avoid them, participants have to suppress their barpressing behavior 
immediately before the shield is connected. Participants are also 
told that there will be some cues that sometimes may (or may not) 
be followed by the activation of the shield. If participants learn that 
a cue is a good predictor of the shield, then they should respond to 
this cue by suppressing their barpressing behavior in anticipation 
of the outcome. Suppression ratios are conventionally assessed as 
A/ (A 1 B), where A is the number of barpresses during the cue and 
B the number of barpresses in a period of time identical to the dura-
tion of the cue and immediately preceding it.
In Experiment 2, the training phase consisted of 69 trials in 
pseudo random order. In both groups, the target cue was presented 
in 30 trials, and the activation of the shield followed 80% of them 
(24 trials). Contingency was manipulated by varying the percentage 
of trials in which the context, rather than the cue, was followed by 
the outcome. In the high-contingency condition, the context was 
never followed by the activation of the shield, whereas in the low-
contingency condition, the context was followed by the shield 80% 
of the time (i.e., 24 trials), thereby making the target cue noncontin-
gent on the shields despite its high probability of being reinforced. 
An additional 15 trials were used in both groups with a filler cue 
that was never followed by the shield, and its only purpose was to 
prevent indiscriminate suppression (Arcediano et al., 1996). The 
target and filler cues were two “Martian letters,” counterbalanced, 
that represented the interception of messages between spaceships 
(Costa, 2009). They appeared from time to time for a duration of 
1.5 sec. At test, the target cue was presented for 3 sec so that the 
suppression ratio could be assessed (see Arcediano et al., 1996). 
Intertrial intervals lasted between 7 and 13.50 sec.
Upon completion of the Martians task, the judgmental variables 
were assessed between participants. The screen presented the target 
cue and a question that had to be answered with a number between 
0 and 100. Half of the participants in each contingency condition re-
ceived a prediction question: If this cue [image of target cue inserted 
here] appears on the screen, to what extent do you think that the 
shield will be activated? The other half received a predictive-value 
question: To what extent do you think that the onset of this cue is a 
good predictor of the activation of the shield?
Results
Behavioral data. The results of Experiment 2 were as 
expected. Participants in the high-contingency condition 
suppressed their barpressing behavior more in response 
to the target cue (M 5 .20; SEM 5 .11) than did those 
in the low-contingency condition (M 5 .27; SEM 5 .23) 
[F(1,32) 5 7.08, p , .05]. (Recall that values closer to 0 
indicate stronger suppression—that is, stronger prepara-
tory behavior in response to the target cue.) Thus, partici-
pants’ preparatory behavior was significantly affected by 
the contingency between the cue and the shield, with those 
exposed to a higher contingency being the ones who sup-
pressed their behavior the most.
Judgments. Figure 2 plots the mean judgments by 
group in this experiment. A 2 (contingency) 3 2 (question) 
ANOVA yielded a significant interaction [F(1,30) 5 6.46, 
p , .05]. No main effects for contingency [F(1,30) 5 2.40, 
p 5 .132] or for question [F(1,30) 5 2.20, p 5 .148] were 
found. Consistent with our hypothesis and with previous 
literature, predictive-value judgments were significantly 
affected by the contingency manipulation [F(1,16) 5 
10.51, p , .01], whereas prediction judgments were not 
[F(1,14) 5 3.97, p 5 . 54].
result reported by De Houwer et al. (2007). Our Experi-
ment 2, therefore, had several goals. The first one was 
to provide a replication for the results of Experiment 1 
using a very different procedure, in which most param-
eters changed, allowing the generality of the effect to be 
assessed. The most important change in this experiment 
was probably that in our dependent variable. A functional 
analysis of contingency learning cannot rely solely on 
what people say that they would do (i.e., their subjective, 
verbalized judgments), or what they say that somebody 
else should do. Our analysis needed convergent evidence 
from the actual, nonverbal, preparatory behavior. Experi-
ment 2 was aimed at extending the findings of Experi-
ment 1 to a more comprehensive framework that included 
not only verbal (numerical) judgments but also, most 
importantly, the nonverbal preparatory behavior itself. 
On a lesser point, we also aimed at using less extreme 
contingencies. Although extreme values were needed 
for a fair comparison with previous research [i.e., both 
De Houwer et al., 2007, and Vadillo et al., 2005, used 
a contingency of 0 and a p(O|C) of 1], and although the 
difference between the contingency and p(O|C) needed to 
be large for the dissociation to be observed, we thought 
it was important to use a lower p(O|C) so as to make sure 
that the results were not restricted to the special condition 
in which the outcome is always present. Also, in order 
to make sure that the dissociation observed in the judg-
mental responses in Experiment 1 was not the result of 
our presenting all of the questions in the same screen, 
we manipulated the question type between participants, 
with each participant answering only one question. Fi-
nally, we used predictive-value rather than causal-value 
questions. If our hypothesis was correct, the dissociation 
that we observed between prediction and causal-value 
judgments should also have been observed between pre-
diction and predictive-value judgments (see, e.g., Vadillo 
et al., 2005).
Method
participants. Thirty-four anonymous volunteers took part in the 
study. A random assignment resulted in 16 participants in the high-
contingency condition, and 18 in the low-contingency condition. 
Orthogonally, 16 participants emitted a prediction judgment at the 
end of training, and 18 emitted a prediction-value judgment.
procedure and Design. In Experiment 2, we used the Martians 
video game that was originally developed by Arcediano, Ortega, 
and Matute (1996); however, we used the new and improved version 
that was developed by Franssen, Clarysse, Beckers, van Vooren, and 
Baeyens (in press),1 and we also incorporated several interesting 
features that were developed by Costa (2009; see note 1). In the Mar-
tians paradigm, the suppression of barpressing behavior is used as an 
analogue to animal conditioning suppression to assess preparatory 
behavior in humans. The participants’ goal is to prevent Martians 
from landing on Earth. Martian spaceships appear on the computer 
screen at a rate of one spaceship every 250 msec. Participants are 
told to fire their laser guns by pressing the space bar, and to destroy 
as many spaceships as possible. Doing this results in a stable bar-
pressing rate. From time to time, the Martians activate an anti laser 
shield consisting of screen flashes and a distinctive sound with a 
duration of 500 msec. This shield is the outcome to be prepared 
for. If the participant continues pressing the bar when the shield is 
active, the laser gun becomes deactivated for 5 sec, and dozens of 
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We cannot know the reason why De Houwer et al. 
(2007) observed a null result in the sensitivity of prepara-
tory judgments to contingency, but the main differences 
between our judgmental study (Experiment 1) and theirs 
are that we manipulated contingency between, rather than 
within, participants; we used 120 training trials rather 
than 10; and we assessed preparatory responses differ-
ently. These, and perhaps several other differences we are 
not aware of, increased the chances that the sensitivity of 
preparatory judgments to contingency could be detected 
in our studies.
Why, then, is contingency learning used to prepare for 
outcomes if it is not used when predicting their occurrence? 
If the outcome is occurring often, regardless of whether the 
cue is present or absent, a normatively adjusted response 
should be sensitive to several facts: (1) The contingency 
between the cue and the outcome is 0; (2) the causal value 
of the cue is 0; (3) the predictive value of the cue is 0; (4) the 
probability that the outcome will occur in the next trial is 
high; and (5) the likelihood (the prediction) that the out-
come will occur following the cue is high. However, which 
would be the most effective preparatory behavior? A prepa-
ratory response speaks to the question of what should be the 
best possible use of knowledge and information in order to 
best adapt to the demands of the environment. This includes 
making good use of knowledge and information, but also 
of energy resources and cost-efficient behavior. Therefore, 
this also includes assessing the high cost of emitting a pre-
paratory response in all trials, irrespective of the predictive 
value of the cue. What the present experiments have shown 
is that once participants know that the outcome will occur 
with a given probability and that there are no clues as to 
what its cause can be, they learn that it makes no sense to 
keep preparing for that outcome whenever any of the many 
irrelevant cues in the environment are present (or at least it 
makes no sense to prepare as intensely as if it were contin-
gent). Although we are often able to predict the occurrence 
of important events just by looking at their base rates, it 
would be impossible to prepare for all types of outcomes 
that may occur, irrespective of their degree of contingency 
with the signals that are present.
Because predictions, preparatory behavior, and prediction-
 value judgments are so often taken as synonyms, we all tend 
to assume that animals use contingency to predict the out-
comes. However, the only thing we can know for sure when 
we work with animals is that they use contingency to prepare 
for outcomes. Whether they use contingency because they 
predict the outcome or because they know that the cue has 
a high predictive value is something that, to our knowledge, 
has not been addressed in the animal literature. Our results 
suggest that, in addition to preparation behavior, it is the pre-
dictive value of cues rather than the predictions of the out-
come that requires contingency. This point should be valid 
for human and nonhuman animals.
In sum, the present experiments have shown that con-
tingency learning may have survival value after all. It is 
true that we do not need it to know the likelihood that 
an outcome will occur, but we do need it if we want to 
be able to select those signals with the higher predictive 
(or causal) value in our environment so that we can en-
DIsCussIon
As was noted in the introduction, it is often assumed 
that the reason why humans and animals extract contin-
gency information from the environment is a very practi-
cal one: being able to identify those cues that signal im-
portant events, so as to be able to predict their occurrence 
and prepare for them.
Previous research has indeed shown that animals use 
contingency information to prepare for outcomes (Res-
corla, 1968). It has also shown that people use contin-
gency information to acquire knowledge not only about 
causation, but also about the predictive (signal) value of 
the cues in the environment (Vadillo et al., 2005; Vadillo 
& Matute, 2007). However, it has also shown that people 
do not use this knowledge to predict the outcomes (see, 
e.g., Gredebäck et al., 2000; Matute et al., 2002; Vadillo 
et al., 2005; Vadillo & Matute, 2007) or to prepare for 
them (De Houwer et al., 2007). This seems inconsistent 
with the general assumption that the function of contin-
gency learning is to predict and prepare for outcomes.
Our present experiments have shown that prepara-
tory judgment and behavior are sensitive to contingency. 
The two experiments used very different procedures and 
dependent variables and demonstrated consistently that 
preparatory judgments and behavior were significantly 
stronger when there was a high level of contingency. Par-
ticipants also used contingency to detect which cues had 
the higher causal and predictive values. Consistent with 
previous reports, however, outcome predictions were not 
based on contingency (see, e.g., Gredebäck et al., 2000; 
Matute et al., 2002; Vadillo et al., 2005; Vadillo & Matute, 
2007). Similar dissociations have been found for judg-
ments about the frequency with which the outcome fol-
lows the cue (Matute, Arcediano, & Miller, 1996) and 
for outcome recall in the presence of the cue (Mitchell, 
Lovibond, & Gan, 2005). Both of them also appear to 
be independent of contingency and different from causal 
judgments. Moreover, related research is also showing 
that people tend to use base rates, rather than contingen-
cies, to infer correlations and to make predictions (Fiedler, 
Freytag, & Meiser, 2009).
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Figure 2. Mean judgments in Experiment 2. Error bars repre-
sent 1 standard error of the mean.
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gage in efficient preparatory behavior. Most importantly, 
and regardless of the merits of the particular account we 
have presented herein, our research calls for the need to 
add preparatory judgments and behavior to the research 
agenda of contingency learning. As was noted in the intro-
duction, the little attention that preparatory judgments and 
behavior have captured in the human learning research 
tradition is surprising, and it will be a task for future re-
search to investigate under which conditions contingency 
learning is or is not useful for preparing for outcomes.
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